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STUDENT NOTES
CRIMINAL LAW--"PARTIAL INSANITY" AS A MEANS OF RE-
DUCING AN INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE TO VOLUNTARY
MANSLAUGHTER
Voluntary manslaughter at common law is usually defined as
the intentional killing of a human being without malice afore-
thought, but in a sudden heat of passion caused by sufficient provo-
cation.' However, it is the contention of some legal writers that the
provocation concept does not include all of the possible causes that
will reduce an intentional homicide to voluntary manslaughter.
In line with this contention, it is the purpose of this note to con-
sider partial insanity as a means of reducing an intentional homi-
cide to voluntary manslaughter. It is well to point out that partial
insanity as used herein refers to an abnormal mental condition but
one not sufficient to constitute "legal insanity" in the particular
jurisdiction.
To be relieved from criminal responsibility on the ground of
insanity the accused must be declared to have been legally insane
at the time of the killing. The test recognized both in the majority
of American states and in England is the "right and wrong" test,
expounded by the court in M'Naghten's Case' defining the degree of
insanity which will entitle the accused to an acquittal.' Although it
is followed by a majority of the states, a minority recognize this test
to be insufficient in many cases and they have supplemented it with
the "irresistible impulse" test.' Such courts take cognizance of the
absence of sufficient will power in the accused to control his actions
and prevent the homicide as a result of his mental condition.' How-
ever, due to the impossibility of saying where mental soundness ends
and mental abnormality begins, the courts are not consistent in ap-
plying these supposedly hard and fast legal tests of insanity.
The difficulty of finding a workable test of "legal insanity" and
also, perhaps, an unwillingness in the courts to extend the defini-
'Olds v State, 44 Fla. 452, 33 So. 296 (1902) Cottrell v. Com-
monwealth, 271 Ky 52, 111 S.W 2d 445 (1937) 2 BURDICK, LAW OF
CRIME sec. 460 (1946)
2 BURDICK, op. cit. supra, note 1, sec. 461, Note, 36 Ky. L.J. 443
(1948)
'10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843)
' Guiteau's Case, 10 Fed. 161 (1882) Judd v State, 41 Ariz. 176,
16 P 2d 720 (1932), Marceau v Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, 101
Cal. 338, 35 Pac. 856 (1894) State v Knight, 95 Me. 467, 50 Atl. 276
(1901).5Parsons v. State, 81 Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887), Ryan v People,
60 Cal. 425, 153 Pac. 756 (1915).
'See State v Peel, 23 Mont. 358, - 59 Pac. 169, 174 (1899).
'GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 207 (1925).
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tion of insanity beyond its present scope in particular jurisdictions,
have caused the courts to make certain adjustments in substantive
rules elsewhere in order to bring the law more into line with
changing social concepts on the general subject of mental abnormal-
ity. One such adjustment occurs in the changed rule, now found in a
few states and recognized by some writers, that one who is par-
tially, though not legally, insane cannot be convicted of first degree
murder.' The courts in those states say that the defendant's mental
disorder (partial insanity) should be considered by the jury to de-
termine if the elements of premeditation and deliberation are pres-
ent. Another method of handling the problem of partial insanity is
to mitigate the punishment rather than the grade of the offense. This
has been accomplished in some European countries by code provi-
sions, whereby the defendant's mental disorder, although not of the
degree to relieve him from criminal responsibility, may nevertheless
be considered to reduce the punishment. Several writers have recog-
nized and espoused the soundness of this method." Recognition is
also given this idea in a Nebraska statute whereby punishment may
be reduced by the Supreme Court in all criminal cases where a sub-
stantial miscarriage of justice has occurred." Using this statute the
Supreme Court has reduced the death sentence to life imprisonment
in homicide cases where partial insanity was a controlling issue."
Although these modifications of the general rule of "legal insanity"
have gained only minority recognition in this country it would seem
that they do indicate evidence of the courts' dissatisfaction with the
present-day law regarding cases that fall within that uncertain range
between sanity and insanity
It seems that an increasing dissatisfaction with the rule of legal
insanity is causing a noticeable change in the substantive law in
another part of the law of homicide. This change is occurring in the
law of voluntary manslaughter.
Thus, in commenting on Davs v. State," a Tennessee case, Pro-
fessor Weihofen states that the decision offers a theory of judging the
See discussion: WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL
LAW 100 (1933) Keedy, Insanity and Crimsnal Responsibility, 30
HARV. L. REV. 535, 551 (1917) Weihofen, Partial Insanity and Crim-
inal Intent, 24 ILL. L. REV. 505, 514 (1930)
"Feebleness of mind or will even though not so extreme as to
justify a finding that the defendant is irresponsible, may properly
be considered by the triers of the facts in determining whether a
homicide has been committed with deliberate and premeditated de-
sign to kill, and may thus be effective to reduce the grade of the
offense." People v. Moran, 249 N.Y 179, 163 N.E. 553 (1928). See
also Jones v Commonwealth, 75 Pa. 403, 410 (1874)
"1 See discussion: WEIHOFEN, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRIMINAL
LAW 98 (1933)
"NEB. COMP. STAT. sec. 29-2308 (1929).
"Muzik v. State, 99 Neb. 496, 156 N.W 1056 (1916), Hamblin v
State, 81 Neb. 148, 115 N.W 850 (1908)
1" 161 Tenn. 23, 28 S.W 2d 993 (1930)
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effect of provoking circumstances not only by an objective standard
of reasonableness, but also by the subjective reaction of the individ-
ual to those circumstances so that the same circumstances not suffi-
cient to provoke a reasonable man may be held sufficient in cases
where partial insanity exists."
The same idea seems even more evident in the language of the
court in other cases. In State v. Green,5 the court held the accused
entitled to an instruction on the law of voluntary manslaughter
stating:
While the record before us fails to show facts
that would be likely to cause a normal mind to be
wrought up to a heat of passion, yet, there is some evi-
dence in the record that the mind of the defendant was so
wrought up, and such evidence, together with the evi-
dence tending to show that the defendant was insane, was
sufficient to entitle the defendant to have the jury in-
structed as to the law of voluntary manslaughter and
have that question submitted to the jury ""
In like manner, the court in Fisher v. The People" reversed a
murder conviction and held that the accused was entitled to an in-
struction on voluntary manslaughter. The requested instruction,
which was allowed, provided that although the prisoner may not
have been so insane as to excuse him entirely yet, the mental ab-
normality should be considered in requiring less provocation where
extreme jealousy (partial insanity) existed than would have been
required had the accused not been jealous."
In Maher v. People,19 the charge was assault with intent to kill
and murder. The accused attempted to prove the crime was simple
assault and battery by reason of the fact that had the victim suc-
cumbed, he would be guilty of only voluntary manslaughter. Evi-
dence offered by the accused in an attempt to prove sufficient cause
for voluntary manslaughter was rejected. On appeal, the appellate
court held that the question involved the same principles as where
evidence is offered in a prosecution for murder and that the evi-
dence should have been received. In further considering sufficiency
"WEIHOFEN, op. cit. supra, note 10, at 103.
"78 Utah 58, 6 P 2d 177 (1931)1 Id. at 67, 6 P 2d at 186 (1931)
' 23 Ill. 218 (1859).
S "Although the prisoner may not have been so insane as to ex-
cuse him entirely, yet, in determining whether at the time of the kill-
ing he acted without deliberation, and under the influence of such a
sudden and irresistible passion as would reduce the grade of the of-
fense from murder to manslaughter, it is proper for the jury, if they
believe that the same provocation would arouse such a sudden and
irresistible passion in his mind, if so affected by jealousy, when it
would not have aroused it if he had not been jealous, to take into
consideration the fact, if proven, that he was jealous, in determining
the degree and extent of the passion which existed at the time of the
killing." Id. at 220.
'" 10 Mich. 212, 81 Am. Dec. 781 (1862).
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of the provocation, the court used the objective standard of a rea-
sonable man but modified it in the following manner: " unless,
indeed, the person whose guilt is m question be shown to have some
peculiar weakness of mind or infirmity of temper, not arising from
wickedness of heart or cruelty of disposition."'
These cases are all decisions involving voluntary manslaughter
and all contain the factor of provocation as an agent for reducing
the homicide from murder to manslaughter. It is also true that they
contain the factor of partial insanity as a possible agent for such re-
duction. The question therefore arises as to what is the proper classi-
fication of these cases. Should the provocation be considered as the
basis for reducing-or should the partial snsanity be considered as
the basis for such reducing? In order to reduce an intentional killing
to voluntary manslaughter it is evident that not only must there be
provocation but it must be sufficient legal provocation.2 The very
fact of itself that a man is provoked is not sufficient to relieve him
from criminal responsibility but it must be that kind of provocation
which the law recognizes as reasonable and adequate." In these cases
under consideration, the courts point out that there is not sufficient
legal provocation to reduce. However, they do say that the provoca-
tion which is present, coupled with the partial insanity may be suf-
ficient. Taking this into consideration, is it not reasonable to con-
clude, where legal provocation is not present, that it is the defend-
ant's abnormal mental condition which forms the real basis for re-
ducing an intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter 9 As a mat-
ter of fact, State v. Green" states that "When insanity is made an
issue in the case of homicide, such insanity may have the effect of
reducing the homicide to voluntary manslaughter.' - In like manner,
in Fisher v. The People, "Though such a state of mind would not
excuse the homicide, it should reduce it to manslaughter for de-
liberation would be absent, and that is essential to constitute
murder.""'
Further evidence that partial insanity may reduce murder to
voluntary manslaughter appears in Mangrun v. Commonwealth'
where the court affirmed a manslaughter conviction in a case of in-
tentional homicide. The court approved the instruction of the lower
court which charged that the defendant should be acquitted if he
was so insane as not to know right from wrong or " if they be-
lieve from the evidence that he was weak or feeble-minded, they
I Id. at 221, 81 Am. Dec. at 786.
"Perkins, The Law of Homzczde, 36 J. CRin. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
412 (1946)
--Miller v Commonwealth, 163 Ky. 246. 173 S.W 761 (1915)
Ryan v. State, 115 Wis. 488, 92 N.W 271 (1902)
"78 Utah 58, 6 P 2d 177 (1931)
"Id. at- 6P 2dat 186.
'23 Ill. 218 (1859).
Id. at 232.
2 19 Ky L. Rep. 94, 39 S.W 703 (1897)
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should consider that fact in determining the degree of Ins guilt and
the measurement of his punishment."' Again, in Rogers v. Common-
wealth,' the court, in holding that the accused was entitled to an
instruction on voluntary manslaughter, seemed to be of the opinion
that the mental condition (feeble-mindedness) of the accused was a
matter " legally put in proof for the consideration of the jury,
for the purpose of guiding them to a correct conclusion on the de-
gree of the appellant's guilt."' The word "degree" is evidently used
here as referring to the degree of felonious homicide rather than m
an attempt to distinguish first from second degree murder."
In summarizing the above discussion, it may be concluded that
partial insanity has been used by a number of courts in reducing an
intentional killing to voluntary manslaughter. These cases point out
a tendency on the part of the courts to take into consideration, m
order that justice may be done and society protected, those unfor-
tunate individuals whose abnormal conditions have not otherwise
been fully considered or accounted for in the law. As to what is con-
sidered as partial insanity the cases above have included insane
delusion, extreme jealousy weak or feeble-mindedness, peculiar
weakness of mind and degree of insanity Whether wise or unwise,
legal writers in advocating changes and developments in the law
have suggested that by considering partial insanity, a result is
reached that harmonizes with sound principle and is consistent with
the public idea of justice."
JoiN J. LARKIN
Id. at 95, 39 S.W at 704.
96 Ky. 24, 27 S.W 813 (1894)
"Id. at 28, 27 S.W at 814.
3 Perkins, supra note 21, at 443.
"WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW sec. 64 (12th ed. 1932).
